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European and Finnish Public procurement law and experience1 
 
KRISTIAN SIIKAVIRTA, Doctor of Law’s, Senior Lecturer, University of Vaasa 
 
I will first describe in this paper the legal structure of European public procurement. The system is 
rather clear but it is evident that the diversity of different goods and constructions works 
auctioned has created additional complexity and legal risk for public authorities. 
After that, I will show how the Commission monitors the performance of member states on public 
procurement. Member state performance does not really tell us if the public procurement law and 
procurement procedure are reaching the goals. However, measurement shows how the procedure 
is working in general. If there are problems in some area, there is a chance for improvement. 
I will shed some light to Finnish experience on public procurement from lawyer’s perspective. 
Observations may be cautiously generalized concerning other member states because the legal 
framework is similar inside European Union. I will try to illuminate why public procurement 
legislation is seen cumbersome although it has goals that are understandable. 
This paper concerns European Union and Finnish law but the real life phenomenon of public 
procurement is global. All over the world, there is a need for public authorities to buy different 
goods from private markets using public funds. There are different legal solutions to this task and 
in this paper I will explain the European approach. 
 
View on procurement legislation in EU 
European public procurement legislation is harmonized by Procurement Directive in 20142. 
Purchases over certain threshold value must be auctioned in an open procedure. In general, public 
authorities must arrange open competitive bidding when they are purchasing goods, services or 
construction works from markets outside their own organization. The aim is to get better value for 
public money, to give equal opportunities for cross border sellers and to improve economic 
growth. European commission supervises compliance and European court has the ultimate power 
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public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, pp. 65–242. 
to interpret the procurement directive in detail. National courts have jurisdiction on national 
procurement law. In Finland, that is Procurement Act on 2016 (1397/2016). 
The goals of European procurement directives since 1990 have been to achieve transparent, fair 
and competitive public procurement across the EU’s Single Market thus generating business 
opportunities, driving economic growth and creating jobs. EU directives are by nature minimum 
regulation which refers to that member states have an opportunity to enact more strict rules. 
The directive regulates only the auction procedure so the law does not tell what should be bought. 
Instead, it orders one to buy with the certain open procedure. That principle is weakened a little 
by the latest reform trying to make public procurement a stronger policy instrument. 
The effects of the legislation are not always as expected so there is lively academic discussion on 
the real effects of the procurement law.3 Also best practices are eagerly looked after.4 Over the 
years the European legislator has made changes to the procurement directives in order to develop 
the law and to respond to the main concerns. These are the complexity of the rules, high 
administrative costs, the fear of clustered markets, and modest share of cross border procurement 
deals. 
The procurement performance of the member states is well documented by the commission but 
real economic effects on costs or on markets is not explicit though they are considered positive. 
Discussion in member states can be skeptical against the effectiveness and costs of public 
auctions. 
Legal principles in Procurement Law 
Public procurement law in Europe is about the formal process by which public authorities, such as 
government departments or the local authorities, purchase goods, services or constructions works 
from private companies. 
General legal principles guiding decision making under procurement law can be found in the 
Procurement Directive (paragraph 1) and they are used in Union Court decisions as a guiding rule. 
Member states may have their own additional principles but they may not contradict EU-
principles. Key Principles in the EU can be expressed in many ways but in general they are as 
follows. 
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4 Communication from the Commission to the Institutions: Making Public Procurement Work in and for Europe, 
COM(2017) 572 final, Strasbourg, 3.10.2017, page 5. 
Equal treatment and Non-discrimination mean that discrimination against bidders from other 
Member States or on some other grounds is not allowed. Furthermore, discrimination against 
bidders from another area inside a member state is not allowed. 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has stated that ”the equal treatment principle 
requires that comparable situations are not treated differently and that different situations are 
not treated similarly unless such a difference or similarity in treatment can be justified 
objectively”5. Furthermore, the contracting party is not allowed to plan auctions in a way that only 
certain firms are able to make offers. 
On an individual tender level, it is still possible to try to shape the selection criteria favoring some 
predetermined firms. If this is suspected and demonstrated before a national court, the tender has 
failed. Selected technical criteria may also bring up equality problems although public authors are 
free to decide what to buy.6 
However, in general the low volume of cross border deals is not a consequence of discrimination 
but normal market conditions, meaning higher costs.7 
The principle of transparency means in practice that information on coming tenders must be 
available to all potential bidders in Europe in a transparent form and language.8 Directive sets out 
step-by-step procedures related to the notice and advertisement of tenders, leaving little choice 
as to when, where, and how to advertise procurement events. The general idea includes also that 
impartiality of the contracting authorities’ decision can be reviewed. 
The Procurement Directive (for example articles, 2, 42) requires that all performance and/or 
functional requirements should be sufficiently precise as to allow the tenderer to determine the 
subject matter of the contract. Reasonably well informed and normally diligent tenderer must be 
able to interpret the notice in the same way.9 
Special standards (for example environmental standards or labels) in contract notices may be used 
but there must be an option available to tenderers to show that required equivalent standards are 
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met. This may be cumbersome for small firms. Highly technical tender documents create 
misunderstandings and legal disputes. 
Member State public procurement policies must comply with the principle of proportionality. The 
CJEU has consistently defined the principle of proportionality as one of the general principles of EU 
law, which requires that measures implemented through EU provisions should be appropriate for 
attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.10 
All above threshold tenders must be carried out through the open procurement process even if 
this would not create any economic benefits. Open tender may in some cases cost more than is 
gained by the lower price. 
Procurement process 
The purchasing process is ordered by the European Union directive, which means that member 
states must implement the rules into their own national laws. The basic feature of the directive is 
an open invitation to take part in the public tender process. All European firms have an equal right 
to make offers. The winner is chosen according to predetermined, open and nonrestrictive criteria. 
The simple idea is that with this procedure the public purchaser finds the best deal and the best 
provider. 
In general, the rules are meant to achieve the efficient use of public resources and enhance 
competition in European Union thus generating economic growth. From that perspective it is 
perhaps surprising that some public authors in member states and member states themselves 
have found it sometimes uncomfortable to play along the public procurement directives and 
rules.11  
Slight unwillingness to comply is the most significant in local administrative levels in the member 
states. This is seen for example in Finland where local level officials sometimes try to find ways not 
to comply with procurement laws. These attempts are however stopped by rival tenderers 
complaining to the Finnish Market Court. Firms are eager to take unlawful practices to the court. 
Both the European and Finnish legislators have seen these compliance problems and the new 
procurement legislation tries to make the procurement process easier and more flexible. 
System description, procurement market 
                                                             
10 Case No. C-491/01, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd 
and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR (‘British American Tobacco’) at paragraph 122; see also cases cited therein. 
11 Christopher Bovis (2005). Public Procurement in the European Union. Palgrave MacMillan, GB, page 1. 
There are over 250 000 individual public authorities in the EU to spend around 14% of GDP on the 
purchase of services, works and supplies. Total annual value is nearly 2000 billion euro. In Finland, 
the total value of public tenders is about 35 billion euro per year. Purchasing volume under the 
directives is lower, about 400 billion euro per year and about 3.6 percent of the EU’s GDP because 
of the threshold values.12 
The volume of award notices is high in Europe reaching over 140 000 notices in 2010. In Finland, 
there are over 17 000 award notices per year. The number of notices is not rising rapidly as it did 
during the last decade. 
The procurement market in Europe is vast in monetary terms, in terms of number and variety of 
different parties like public authorities and private firms, and in terms of variety of different goods, 
services or construction works. 
This immediately creates a problem for the legislator and for procurement authorities. The same 
law must be applied to all tenders with some exceptions. In order to solve the problem, the 
legislator has made the law quite complex. The public author must in turn try to find the most 
advantageous solution when arranging a separate tender. The law itself does not say what option 
would be the best. 
The large monetary value of procurement induces politicians and legislator to use public 
procurement as a strategic tool for different policies. Currently the rules emphasize policies aimed 
at creating a more innovative, green and socially inclusive economy, as well as those boosting jobs, 
growth and investment. However, the real effect of procurement on public policies depends 
heavily on the actual design of awards, competence of public authorities, market share of public 
authorities, and bidders desire to take part in tenders including strategic elements. Changing 
policy recommendations may create uncertainty within public authors and firms. 
Performance analysis13 
In European Union there is a Commission driven initiative to assess the effectiveness of the public 
procurement system in all member states.14 One major task is to evaluate how different EU 
countries are performing on the public procurement process. That does not however describe 
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directly how efficient the system is ensuring the best value for money in individual procurement 
awards or how procurement can be used as a policy instrument. 
The success of the public procurement system is evaluated with nine indicators. The information 
assessing indicators comes from notices published in the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) where all 
above threshold auctions are published. Performance indicators are expressed below. Commission 
experts have made the qualitative policy judgement on what is good or bad practice. The bold 
indicators picture the competitiveness of the procurement system. Indicators 7 to 9 indicate 







1. One Bidder Auctions < 10 % > 20 % competitiveness 
2. No Calls for Bids < 5 % > 10 % competitiveness 
3. Publication Rate > 5 % < 2.5 % competitiveness 
4. Cooperative 
Procurement 
> 10 % < 10 % expertise 
5. Award Criteria in 
auctions, lowest price 
< 80 % > 80 % expertise 
6. Decision Speed < 120 days > 120 days expertise 
7. Missing Values (Bad 
info) 
< 3 % > 3 % transparency 
8. Missing Calls for Bids 
(Bad info) 
< 3 % > 3 % transparency 
9. Missing Registration 
Numbers (Bad info) 
< 3 % > 3 % transparency 
 
Explanation15: 
One bidder auction (No. 1) means that there is only one offer delivered to the auction. This 
indicates that lively competition does not exist and best value for money is perhaps not achieved. 
The more bidders are participating the better results are expected. 
No calls for bids (No. 2) means that procurement is done without prior notification. Only private 
negotiation between a public purchaser and a firm is carried out. In this case, there is no 
competition between bids or bidders and the best value for money is not guaranteed by 
competition. 
The publication rate (No. 3) illustrates the monetary value of published auctions compared with 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) where GDP is the denominator. The larger value means a larger 
share of published auctions in domestic economy, which is considered advantageous. 
The cooperative procurement indicator (No. 4) tells how often public authors cooperate with each 
other when they engage in procurement. Cooperation may involve purchasing on behalf of other 
public author or joint procurement, or even using central purchasing body. Cooperation gives 
public authors the stronger market position and is thought to lead to lower prices and better value 
for money. Cooperation also gives an opportunity to exchange expertise for good procurement 
practices and for different markets.  
Award criteria indicator (No. 5) tells how public buyers choose the companies they award the 
contract to. This indicator measures whether decision is based on the price alone, or if also the 
quality is taken into account. The over-reliance in price suggests better criteria could have been 
used. 
Decision speed (No. 6) measures the mean length of the decision-making period. This is the time 
between the deadline for receiving offers and the award of the contract. Lengthy procedures are 
considered expensive and causing unnecessary uncertainty for both the public buyers and private 
companies. 
Missing Values (No. 7) illustrates transparency and tells that public buyers provide insufficient 
information on their procurement. The indicator measures the proportion of contracts awarded 
without full information about the expected value. A lower "Missing Values" indicator score is 
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better, as it means companies can make better bidding decisions and citizens know how their 
money is spent. 
Missing Calls for Bids (No. 8) tells that public buyers provide insufficient information about their 
procurement. The indicator measures the proportion of contract awards for which a call for bids 
took place, but it is not evident what the name of the call was or what the conditions were. A 
lower "Missing Calls for Bids" indicator score is better, because it means businesses and citizens 
can understand how contractors have been selected. 
Missing Registration Number (No. 9) tells that public buyers provide insufficient information about 
their procurement. The indicator measures the proportion of procedures where the business 
registration number was not included meaning that it is not easy to identify the buyer or the 
seller. 
Procurement risk – material and legal risk 
There is always a risk in public procurement. Risk can be separated at least into internal, 
commercial, and legal risks. Internal risk refers to the public author’s ability to buy right 
commodities in right time. Commercial risk means the probability that the winner does not deliver 
the goods as promised. Legal risk means a threat that the procedure goes wrong and public 
author’s procurement decision is overruled by the court. There may be even economic penalties 
on unlawful conduct. Legal risk in public procurement is perhaps more severe than in private 
procurement. 
Law on public procurement is procedural in nature. It is not possible or reasonable to dictate what 
should be bought. Of course, the procedural nature of the law creates an administrative burden to 
the buyer and to the seller.16 Another consequence is increased legal risk. The bidder treated in an 
illegal manner is entitled to compensation if there is a reason to believe that the bidder would 
have won the auction. 
Legal risk has unfortunate effects on procurement practices. The public author may want to avoid 
risk. This is done for example by relying on conventional technology and on large established 
providers, or by arranging larger auctions. Risk may be avoided by cooperating with other public 
institutions. This may lead to market concentration on buyers’ side but also on sellers’ side. 
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Procurement law has changed a few times in Europe and in member states. The general aim of 
these changes has been a more flexible and simpler procurement procedure. Judicial safeguards 
for sellers are made stronger and strategic procurement is encouraged.  
An open and straight forward bidding procedure is not ideal for buying complex services. It is 
considered for example troublesome to use auctions for buying services that include long and 
personal care relations in social and health care sectors. In addition, demanding building projects 
are not easy for procurement authorities. Problems emerge usually in the difficulty of drafting 
reasonably clear procurement documents.  
Failed procurement process opens an opportunity for competitors to take the public author to the 
national court. Opportunity is usually open to firms that have participated in the auction and are 
treated unequally. Legal risks are additional risks above normal commercial risks. 
In Finland, the procurement procedure fails most often in the phases of preparing procurement 
documents and selecting the winner. An invitation for a bid must be so exact that firms can make 
comparable offers. If the invitation is not exact, bids will not be comparable and the best offer is 
not found. Then the firms have an interest to take the decision to the court if they have lost the 
auction. If the court annuls the decision, a new auction has to be organized. 
The most advantageous offer has to be chosen according to predetermined rules. When final bids 
are delivered, the public author cannot change the rules any more. In cases where the winner is 
chosen not only by the lowest price but also by the best quality, there is a high probability to make 
mistakes. In Finland, unclear selection criteria are a common ground to take the decision to the 
court. 
For the competitors court proceedings give a possibility to get the deal or harm competitors. If the 
procurement decision goes to the court, it means delay and an additional cost. Public authors of 
course avoid court cases for example by using cautious procurement strategies that are however 
thought to have negative consequences to innovation. 
Although the possibility to take procurement decision to court may cause additional costs to 
auctions, it is considered highly necessary both at EU and at the national level. 
Summary 
There is a lot of information on how procurement process works in Europe and in Member States. 
However, there is not a sound picture on what are the effects of procurement law compared with 
a state without mandatory legislation. So, one cannot without question be convinced that the law 
has only beneficial effects.  The administrative cost and legal risk are identified and they are taken 
into account in legal reforms. 
When one considers experience by now, it may be pointed out that procurement costs do not 
always allow cross border procurement where competitiveness is weaker anyhow. Furthermore, 
market reactions are not perhaps what expected since concentration has been noticed and prices 
can go up or down. In some fields of operations, procurement may hurt customers. Legal risk 
increases costs and has other negative effects in public procurement. 
Country performance is analyzed by the Commission according to the success of the procedure. It 
does not tell how markets and prices are behaving neither what are the administrative costs. 
Assumption is that the more competitive and transparent procurement process is the better is the 
price and quality. Real changes in prices are harder to find out. 
It is not easy to say if the awarded contract really is the best there is. The reason is imperfect 
information. One cannot for example compare the results of competitive bidding with the results 
of private negotiations. There is lack of imaginative surveys measuring the impact of procurement 
rules on economy in general and on specific markets. However, general understanding is that 
competitive bidding gives economic benefits. 
